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Section
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Recommended Reading
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I
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Catherine Drinker Bowen, Miracle at Philadelphia: A
Story of the Constitutional Convention, May to September,
1787 Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederation:
An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of
the American Revolution, 1774-1781 (1970); Merrill
Jensen, The New Nation (1950); Merrill Jensen, The
Making of the American Constitution (1979); Gordon S.
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic,
1776-1787 (1969); Herbert J. Storing, What the
Antifederalist Were For (191).
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II(A)
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Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch
(1965); John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory
of Judicial Review (1980); Bruce Ackerman,
Discovering the Constitution, 93 Yale L. J. 1013 1023
(1984); Robert N. Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A
Realistic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a Democratic
Society 67 Iowa Law Review 711 (1982); Paul Brest, A
Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975); Robert N.
Clinton, Original Understanding, Legal Realism, and the
Interpretation of "This Constitution," 72 Iowa Law
Review 1177-1279 (1987); David Currie, The Constitution
in the Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts,
1801-1835, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 646 (1982); Felix
Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function,
69 Harv. L. Rev. 217 (1955); James Thayer, The Origin
and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 129 (1893); William W. Van Alstyne,
A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.
Rev. 1; Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1959)
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II(C)
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Akil Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III:
Separating the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65
Boston U. L. Rev. 205 (1985); Paul Bator, Congressional
Power over the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27
Vill. L. Rev. 1030 (1982); Calabresi & Rhodes, The
Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1992); Robert N.
Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Jurisdiction: A
Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III,
132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1984); Robert N. Clinton, A
Mandatory View of Federal Jurisdiction: Early Implementation
of and Departures from the Constitutional Plan, 86
Columbia Law Review 1515-1621 (1986); Henry Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1362
(1953); Martin Redish, Constitutional Limitations on
Congressional Power to Control Federal Jurisdiction, 77
N.W. L. Rev. 143 (1982); Ratner, Congressional Power over
the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 157 (1960); Sager, Foreword: Constitutional
Limitations on Congress= Authority to Regulate the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 17
(1981); Herbert Wechsler, The Constitution and the
Courts, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001 (1963); William W. Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15
Ariz. L. Rev. 229 (1973).
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II(C)&(D)
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Lea Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article III:
Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement,
93 Harv. L. Rev. 297 (1979); Field, The Advisory
Opinion -- An Analysis, 24 Ind, L. J. 203 (1949); Robert
L. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 Yale L. J.
221 (1988); Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the
Passive Virtues, 64 Colum. L. Rev. 1 (1964); Louis
Henkin, Is There a Political Question Doctrine?, 85
Yale. L J. 597 (1976); Gene Nichol, Causation as a
Standing Requirement: The Unprincipled Use of Judicial
Restraint, 69 Ky. L. Rev. 185 (1980-81); Henry Monaghan,
Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82
Yale L. J. 1363 (1973); Gene Nichol, Abusing Standing: A
Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635
(1984); James O'Fallon, Of Justiciability, Remedies, and
Public Law Litigations: Notes on the Jurisprudence of
Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1984); Robert Sedler,
Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the
Supreme Court, 71 Yale L. J. 599 (1962); Antonin Scalia,
The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the
Separation of Powers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881 (1983);
Cass Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1432 (1988); Mark Tushnet, The
New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment, 62 Cornell
L. Rev. 663 (1977); Note, The Mootness Doctrine in the
Supreme Court, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 373 (1974).
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III(A)
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Jesse Choper, Judicial Review and the National
Political Process 171-259 (1980); John Marshall's
Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland (Gerald Gunther ed.
1969); Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the
Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup.
Ct. Rev. 95; John H. Ely, Legislative and Administrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L. J. 1205
(1970); Plous & Baker, McCulloch v. Maryland: Right
Principle, Wrong Case, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 710 (1957);
Herbert Wechsler, Principles, Politics, and Fundamental
Law 49-82 (1961, first published in 1954); Garry Wills,
Explaining America: The Federalist (1981);
Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does
Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. Legal Stud. 593
(1980);
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III(B)(1)
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Daniel A. Farber and Philip P. Frickey, The
Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873
(1987); Lawrence Berger and S. Rayan Johansson, Child
Health in the Workplace: The Supreme Court in Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 5 J. Health Politics, Policy and Law 81 (1980);
Richard E. Levy, Escaping Lochner's Shadow: Toward a
Coherent Jurisprudence of Economic Rights, 73 N.C. L.
Rev. 329 (1995); Barry Cushman, A Stream of Legal
Consciousness: The Current of Commerce Doctrine From Swift
to Jones and Laughlin, 61 Fordham L. Rev. 105 (1992);
Thurlow Gordon, The Child Labor Law Case, 32 Harv.
L. Rev. 45 (1918); William Carey Jones, The Child Labor
Decision, 6 Calif. L. Rev. (1918); William Sutherland,
The Child Labor Cases and the Constitution, 8 Cornell
L.Q. 338 (1923). Cushman, The National Police Power Under
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, 3 Minn. L. Rev.
289 (1919)
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III(B)(2)
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Robert Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy (1941); Leonard Baker, Back to Back -- The
Duel Between FDR and the Supreme Court (1967); Peter
Irons, The New Deal Lawyers (1982); David P. Currie,
The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The New Deal,
1931-1940, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 504 (1987); Michael E.
Parrish, New Deal Symposium: The Great Depression, the
New Deal, and the American Legal Order, 59 Wash. L. Rev.
723 (1984) Leuchtenburg, The Origins of Franklin D.
Roosevelt's "Court-Packing Plan." 1966 Sup. Ct. Rev.
347; Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy,
1933-1946, 59 Harv. L. Rev. 645 (1946).
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III(C)
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Richard Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce
Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1987); Paul Brest, The
Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional
Interpretation, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 585 (1975); William N.
Eskridge, and John Ferejohn, The Elastic Commerce Clause:
A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 Vand. L.
Rev. 1355 (1994).
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III(D)
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Barber, National League of Cities v. Usery: New
Meaning for the Tenth Amendment, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 161;
Phil Frickey, A Further Comment on Stare Decisis and the
Overruling of National League of Cities, 2
Constitutional Commentary 341 (1985); Robert Nagel,
Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of
Cities in Perspective, 1981 Sup. Ct. Rev. 81; Andrzej
Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence
of Federalism after Garcia, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 341; Mark
Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League
of Cities, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1623 (1994); Philip Frickey,
Lawnet: The Case of the Missing (Tenth) Amendment, 75
Minn. L. Rev. 755 (1991); Martha Field, Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The Demise of a
Misguided Doctrine, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 84 (1985); Carol
Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State
and Local Liability, 20 Urb. Law 301 (1988); Bernard
Schwartz, National League of Cities Again: R.I.P. or a
Ghost That Still Walks?, 54 Ford. L. Rev. 141 (1985);
William Van Alstyne, The Second Death of Federalism,
83 Mich. L. Rev. 1709 (1985).
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III(F)
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Charles Black, Foreword: State Action, Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harv. L.
Rev. 69 (1967); Robert Glennon and John Nowak, A
Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment A State
Action Requirement, 1976 Sup. Ct. Rev. 221; Mark
Tushnet, Shelly v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality,
33 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 383 (1988); Stephen Ross,
Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72 Minn. L.
Rev. 311 (1987); Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme
Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us?
An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1029 (1993); Stephen L. Carter, The
Morgan Power and the Forced Reconsideration of
Constitutional Decisions, 53 U. Chi L. Rev. 819 (1986);
Jesse Choper, Congressional Power to Expand Judicial
Definitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War
Amendments, 67 Minn. L. Rev. 299 (1982).
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IV(A)
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Paul Verkuil, Separation of Powers, The Rule of Law,
and the Idea of Independence, 30 Wm. and Mary L. Rev.
301 (1989); Suzanna Sherry, Separation of Powers: Asking
a Different Question, 30 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 287
(1989); Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the
Intentions of the Founding Fathers, with Special Emphasis
upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 27 Ark. L.
Rev. 583 (1973); Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation
of Powers: Some Early Versions and Practices, 30 Wm. and
Mary L. Rev. 211 (1989); Russel Osgood, Early Versions
and Practices of Separation of Powers: A Comment, 30 Wm.
and Mary L. Rev. 279 (1989).
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IV(B)
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Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional
Myth (1974); Alan Westin, The Anatomy of a Constitutional
Case (1958); Ralph Abascal and John Kramer,
Presidential Impoundment (Part I: Historical Genesis and
Constitutional Framework, 62 Geo. L.J. 1549 (1974);
Edwin Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick
Without Straw, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 53 (1953); Paul
Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President
and the Supreme Court, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 141 (1952);
Harold A. Koh, The National Security Constitution:
Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair 139-40
(1990); Maeva Marcus, Separation of Powers in the Early
National Period, 30 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 269 (1989);
Maeva Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The
Limits of Presidential Power (1977); Lee Marks and John
C. Grabow, The President's Foreign Economic Powers After
Dames and Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence,
68 Cornell l. Rev. 68 (1982); Abner Mikva and Michael Hertz,
Impoundment of Funds: The Courts, the Congress, and the
President: A Constitutional Triangle, 69 Nw. L. Rev. 335
(1974); Miller, Dames and Moore v. Regan: A Political
Decision by a Political Court, 29 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1104
(1982); William H. Rehnquist, Robert H. Jackson: A
Perspective Twenty-Five Years Later, 44 Albany L. Rev.
533 (1980); Peter Shane, Legal Disagreement and
Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive
Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 461
(1987).
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IV(C)
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Martin Redish, The Constitution as Political
Structure (1991); Rebecca Brown, Separated Powers and
Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1513 (1991); Stephen
Carter, From Sick Chicken to Synar: The Evolution and
Subsequent De-Evolution of the Separation of Powers,
1987 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 719; Kenneth C. Davis, A New Approach
to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713 (1969); Javits and
Klein, Congressional Oversight and the Legislative Veto:
A Constitutional Analysis, 52 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 455 (1977);
L. Harold Levinson, Legislative and Executive Veto of
Rules of Administrative Agencies: Models and
Alternatives, 24 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 79 (1982); Lee
Liberman, Morrison v. Olson: A Formalistic Perspective on
Why the Court Was Wrong, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 313 (1989);
Richard Pierce, Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers,
and the Structure of Government, 1988 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1;
Martin Redish and Elizabeth Cisar, If Angels Were to
Govern: The Need for Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of
Powers Theory, 41 Duke L. J. 449 (1991); Richard
Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1667 (1975); Peter Strauss,
Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation of Powers
Questions: A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev.
488 (1987); Laurence Tribe, The Legislative Veto
Decision: a Law by Any Other Name?, 21 Harv. J. Legis. 7
(1984).
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IV(A)
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Martin Redish and Shane Nugent, The Dormant Commerce
Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism,
1987 Duke L.J. 569; Mark Tushnet, Rethinking the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 125; Daniel A.
Farber, State Regulation and the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 3 Const. Comm. 395 (1986); Julian Eule,
Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale
L.J. 425 (1982); Henry Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974
Term: Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L.
Rev.1 (1975); Donald Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1091 (1986); Dan Coenen,
Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 395 (1989);
David Pomper, Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The
Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial Natural Resources,
and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1309
(1989).
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