Supplement to Chapter S-14
(DNA Typing: Freeing the Innocent)
Copyright © 2006 DH Kaye
House v. Bell
386 F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2004)
ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Paul House appeals from the district court's denial of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A Tennessee jury found House guilty of the murder of a neighbor, Carolyn Muncey, and sentenced him to death.
This court granted a certificate of appealability as to all issues. However, House has limited his brief to a discussion of only two claims: 1) Whether the manner in which the Tennessee courts applied the state law doctrine of waiver during House's post-conviction proceedings constitutes an adequate and independent state procedural bar to his ineffective assistance of counsel claims; and 2) assuming that the Tennessee courts properly deemed House's claims to be waived, whether that waiver should be excused on the grounds that House has established his actual innocence under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995). After the Tennessee Supreme Court declined a request by an en banc panel of this court to answer certified questions relating to issues of state law, House v. Bell, 311 F.3d 767 (6th Cir.2002), this court is again faced with the same claims.
Having considered the arguments of the parties regarding the two claims that are before us, we affirm the district court's denial of the writ for the reasons set forth below.
This court reviews a district court's legal conclusions in a habeas proceeding de novo and its factual findings for clear error. See Lucas v. O'Dea, 179 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir.1999). House initiated this habeas action on September 30, 1996; the petition was amended on September 16, 1997. Consequently, this court's review of the state court's decision is governed by the standards set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997); Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir.1997).
Because factual determinations by state courts are entitled to a presumption of correctness, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), we will describe the factual circumstances surrounding the murder for which House was convicted by quoting from the Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion denying him relief in his direct appeal:
The victim of the homicide was Mrs. Carolyn Muncey, who lived with her husband and two young children on Ridgecrest Road in rural Union County, Tennessee. Mrs. Muncey was in her late twenties, and her children were about eight and ten years old at the time of her death on July 13, 1985.
In March 1985 appellant Paul Gregory House was released from a prison in Utah and moved to the rural community in which the Muncey family lived. . . .
Mrs. Muncey disappeared from her home in the late evening of Saturday, July 13, 1985. Her badly beaten body was found on the following afternoon at about 3 p.m., lying partially concealed in a brush pile about 100 yards from her home. . . .
Appellant never confessed to any part in the homicide, and the testimony linking him to it was circumstantial. There was evidence showing that he knew Mr. and Mrs. Muncey and had been with them socially on a few occasions. Through defense proof there was testimony that Mrs. Muncey and her husband had been having marital difficulties and that she had been contemplating leaving him. There was no evidence to indicate that the appellant was aware of that situation, however, or that there had been any previous romantic or sexual relationship between him and the victim.
On the afternoon of Sunday, July 14, 1985, two witnesses saw the appellant emerge from a creek bank at the side of Ridgecrest Road at the site where Mrs. Muncey's body was later found concealed in the underbrush. He was wiping his hands with a dark cloth and was walking toward a white Plymouth automobile, parked on the opposite side of the road, belonging to his girl friend Donna Turner. The two witnesses spoke briefly to appellant, all of them discussing the fact that Mrs. Muncey had disappeared. Later the two witnesses became suspicious of what they had observed and returned to the point where they had seen appellant emerge from the embankment. Looking down the bank, they found the partially concealed body of Mrs. Muncey. They promptly notified the sheriff.
Appellant later admitted that he had been in the area but denied that he had seen the body of Mrs. Muncey or had any knowledge of its presence. The dark rag which he had been using when first seen was never produced. It was the theory of the State, however, that this was a dark “tank top” or jersey which appellant was shown to have been wearing on the previous evening, July 13.
Appellant gave two statements to investigating officers in which he denied being involved in the homicide. In both of these statements he stated that he had been at Ms. Turner's trailer the entire evening of July 13 and that he had not left until the next afternoon when he went to look for Hubert Muncey after learning of the disappearance of the latter's wife.
On Sunday afternoon various witnesses observed that appellant had numerous scratches and bruises on his arms, hands and body, there being an especially significant bruise on the knuckle of his right ring finger. Appellant explained that these injuries had been sustained innocently earlier during the week, but when Ms. Turner was called as a witness, she said that she had not observed them prior to the evening of July 13. Appellant also told investigators that he was wearing the same clothes on Sunday, July 14 as he had been wearing the previous evening. It was later discovered, however, that a pair of blue jeans which he had been wearing on the night of the murder was concealed in the bottom of the clothes hamper at Ms. Turner's trailer. These trousers were bloodstained, and scientific evidence revealed that the stains were human blood having characteristics consistent with the blood of Mrs. Muncey and inconsistent with appellant's own blood. Scientific tests also showed that fibers from these trousers were consistent with fibers found on the clothing of the victim. There were also found on her nightgown and underclothing some spots of semen stain from a male secretor of the same general type as appellant.
Some of the most damaging evidence against appellant was given by his girl friend, Ms. Turner. She at first told investigators that he had not left the trailer [where he lived with her] during the course of the evening of July 13. Later, however, she modified this testimony to state that he had been in the trailer until about 10:45 p.m. at which time he left to take a walk. When he returned an hour or so later, he was panting, hot and exhausted. He was no longer wearing either his blue jersey or his tennis shoes. The shoes were later found in an area different from the place where appellant told her he had lost them.
Appellant told Ms. Turner that he had thrown away the navy blue tank top because it had been torn when he was assaulted by some persons who tried to kill him. It was after the appellant's return to the trailer that Ms. Turner first noticed the bruises and abrasions on his hands referred to previously.
. . .
State v. House, 743 S.W.2d 141, 142-44 (Tenn.1987).
[After pursuing state post-conviction remedies,] House filed a pro se habeas petition on September 30, 1996, which was eventually amended after the district court granted 675 in forma pauperis status and appointed counsel. The district court granted the State's motion for summary judgment on the majority of claims in an order entered June 25, 1998. In February 1999, it conducted an evidentiary hearing on House's claim that the procedural default of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims was excused because he could establish his actual innocence. After considering post-hearing briefs of counsel, the district court denied habeas relief. . . . On March 11, 2002, a three-judge panel of this court issued an opinion rejecting House's claims and affirming the district court's denial of the writ. House v. Bell, 283 F.3d 737 (6th Cir.2002) (withdrawn). That opinion was vacated when a majority of the active judges of the court voted to rehear the case en banc. On November 22, 2002, following oral argument, the en banc court issued an opinion certifying questions of state law to the Tennessee Supreme Court. House v. Bell, 311 F.3d 767 (6th Cir.2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 937 (2003). The Tennessee Supreme Court declined to answer the questions. House v. Bell, No. M2003-01952-SC-S23-CQ (Tenn. Nov. 24, 2003). . . .
We now turn to House's other claim. House argues that even if his ineffective assistance of counsel claims have been procedurally defaulted, he has established his actual innocence of the crime for which he was convicted, a showing which, if made, revives his ineffectiveness claims. In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), the Supreme Court held that a petitioner must show either cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice in order to obtain habeas review of an otherwise procedurally defaulted claim. House seeks to invoke the miscarriage of justice exception here. With respect to a miscarriage of justice, a petitioner must demonstrate that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent of the crime.” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324. . . . The Court cautioned that this exception is rare and should be applied only in the extraordinary case, concluding that, “[t]o establish the requisite probability [that a petitioner is actually innocent], the petitioner must show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence.” Id., 513 U.S. at 327.
Because the district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on this issue, there is testimony about events beyond that which was presented during the original trial. House contends that this new evidence is sufficient to establish his actual innocence. We will summarize that evidence and the district court's response to it before explaining why, in our view, House has failed to show that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.
House testified for the first time at the evidentiary hearing. He offered this version of the night of murder: "I went for a walk. I got jumped, ran around, came back." [More specifically, House testified that he was attacked by two men from a truck and that, after struggling with them, he ran through the woods in the dark.] * * * When asked why he initially lied to investigators by telling them he had not left the trailer at all, House responded, "I was on parole. I didn't want to draw attention to myself."
During the evidentiary hearing, House devoted considerable time to the trial testimony of Billy Ray Hensley, the witness who saw House near the spot where the body was discovered. Specifically, House introduced maps and photographs in order to show that Hensley could not have seen what he purported to see from the place where he claimed to have been. . . . However, even if we accept House's contention that Hensley could not have seen him until he emerged onto the road, it is undisputed that House was seen in the general vicinity 680 of the body carrying a black rag. Moreover, trial counsel effectively cross-examined Hensley regarding his inconsistent statements about when and where he saw House. . . .
In addition to presenting his own version of events while attempting to cast doubt on the accuracy of Hensley's testimony, House takes aim at the physical evidence that linked him to the crime.
Dr. Alex Carabia performed the autopsy of Mrs. Muncey's body. He testified at the trial that death was caused by a blow to the left side of her head. Mrs. Muncey died about an hour and a half after she was hit.
At trial, photographs of the bruises on House's body were entered into evidence and three witnesses testified about his physical condition. Prior to his arrest, House provided various accounts of their origin, attributing them to a mysterious fight on the night of the murder and to tearing down a shed a few days earlier. During closing argument, the prosecution emphasized these inconsistent statements.
Also at trial, FBI Agent Paul Bigbee testified that the blood samples taken from the victim were degraded. Nonetheless, the blood found on the jeans was consistent with that of the victim and not with that of House.
At the evidentiary hearing, House mounted a concerted challenge to this evidence.
Four vials of blood were taken from the victim during the autopsy. These were placed in a styrofoam container, which was sent from the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation (TBI) to the FBI. House referred to two demonstrative exhibits in the district court: photographs of the styrofoam container viewed from above and from the side. The container was sealed with tape by the TBI in both directions for shipping. The photograph of the side view shows that one of the seals was broken and then resealed by a second layer of tape. FBI Agent Bigbee placed his lab number on the second layer. The first layer of tape is incomplete; it only covers the lid of the container. Agent Bigbee conceded that it was possible that the first seal had been cut before the second seal had been placed over it. To support the theory that the container was opened between the time it left the TBI and arrived at the FBI, House points to the fact that the label on the container indicated that it held both blood and vaginal secretions. Yet, Agent Bigbee received the secretions separately in a manila envelope.
As mentioned above, four vials of blood were sent to the FBI. According to Agent Bigbee, he would have used one fourth of a vial in testing. House's trial serology expert, Howard Bragdon, took a photograph when he received the styrofoam container from the FBI. In House's view, the photograph shows that one of the vials was only one-half full and another was nearly empty. Furthermore, despite Agent Bigbee's testimony to the contrary, it appeared that some of the blood had spilled, although there is no evidence indicating that the spillage had occurred before the FBI received the blood.
At the evidentiary hearing before the district court, Dr. Cleland Blake, Assistant Chief Medical Examiner for the State, examined the results of the FBI tests of the blood found on the blue jeans and also the blood taken from Mrs. Muncey's body at the autopsy. He theorized, based upon the degree of the enzymatic degradation, that the blood on the blue jeans came from known samples, such as the blood contained in the vials, and not from Mrs. Muncey's body. When confronted with 681 this conclusion, Agent Bigbee was doubtful, noting that the extent of enzymatic degradation could vary greatly from specimen to specimen taken from the same source depending upon the manner in which the specimens were handled after being extracted from the source, and upon other individual circumstances. To bolster Blake's conclusion, House asserted that the locations of the blood stains on the jeans were unlikely to have been caused by a struggle between House and the victim. The five stains were found on the outside left leg, on the inside left thigh, on the inside right pocket, outside the right pocket, and on the right cuff, respectively.
An expert on blood spatter analysis, Paulette Sutton, also testified at the evidentiary hearing. She testified, contradicting House's assertion, that the pattern of some of the blood spots on House's jeans was consistent with transfer stains resulting from blood being wiped onto them, that some of the stain patterns demarcated folds, and that the rest of the stains were consistent with spatter. She also noted, however, that some of the blood stains on the jeans were mixed with mud, although the photographs of the crime scene showed no mud present. Furthermore, National Weather Service records show that it had not rained for three days prior to the murder. Finally, there was no mud on the victim's nightgown.
The court recounted the discovery of the blue jeans in these terms:
TBI Agent Charles Scott testified that he became involved in the investigation of Mrs. Muncey's murder, at the request of another agent, on the second day of the investigation. He took a statement from Mr. House and obtained consent to search from Ms. Turner. He went to Ms. Turner's home and seized a pair of blue jeans from the clothes hamper in the bathroom. The jeans had “reddish brown” stains that he suspected was [sic] blood on the upper part of the jeans and near the cuff; there was also some light colored mud that was not completely dry. Mr. Scott did not thoroughly examine the jeans at that time but rather folded them and put them in a paper bag. Mr. Scott did not recall ever seeing the jeans in a plastic bag.Memorandum Opinion, February 16, 2000, at 23.
The court then summarized the testimony of House's expert witnesses. Larry Johnson testified as an expert in crime scene investigation and opined that “the packaging of materials in the case did not meet professional standards” because items were not wrapped separately. DNA expert Lisa Calandro eliminated House as the donor of the semen found on Mrs. Muncey's underwear and nightgown.
Howard Bragdon testified for House as well. Bragdon was the manager of laboratory operations for DCI Laboratory in Nashville. This laboratory had performed the blood analysis for House at trial. Bragdon noted that he took possession of the blue jeans, the victim's clothes and fingernail scrapings, as well as blood from both the victim and House, on October 29, 1985. The next day, after transporting them to Nashville, he took pictures that showed dried blood around the upper left corner of the box in which the items had been contained. According to the district court, “Mr. Bragdon admitted that it was his custom to inspect the condition of serological evidence when he took possession and that there was no notation on the receipt of spillage. Mr. Bragdon also admitted that he had no way of knowing the condition of the blood samples at the time of the FBI's serological testing.” Memorandum Opinion, February 16, 2000, at 35.
The court characterized Dr. Blake's testimony as follows:
Dr. Blake testified that there was no total chain of custody. Also, according to Dr. Blake, Dr. Carabia [the coroner] failed to refrigerate and preserve the blood in the tubes, failed to seal the tubes of blood, which could result in spillage, and failed to package the items individually.Memorandum Opinion, February 16, 2000, at 37-38.
Dr. Blake's testimony was based upon his review of photographs of the physical evidence, and was relevant to Dr. Blake's opinion that the blood on petitioner's blue jeans resulted from spillage of Mrs. Muncey's blood in the laboratory tubes. * * * .
* * *
Dr. Blake testified that if fresh blood had spilled on the blue jeans while Mrs. Muncey was alive, and then dried, the enzymes on the jeans would not have deteriorated to the same extent as the enzymes in the blood taken from Mrs. Muncey. From this, Dr. Blake concluded the blood was not spilled on the jeans but rather came from the spillage of the test tubes.
Dr. Blake also testified with respect to the age of Mr. House's bruises, based upon photographs taken from the state court record. Dr. Blake estimated some bruises at one to two days old; others at five to six days old. Also, in Dr. Blake's opinion, the bruising on Mr. House's right ring finger was an injury from being mashed; it was not consistent with striking someone.
The district court also summarized the testimony of the blood spatter expert, Ms. Sutton, and noted that her testimony contradicted the theory that blood had spilled from the vials onto the blue jeans “because the blood and mud [with which it had mixed] would have had to have spilled at the same time.” Memorandum Opinion, February 16, 2000, at 42.
With respect to the blood, the court determined:
Without question, one or more tubes of Mrs. Muncey's blood spilled at some time. It is likely the spillage occurred prior to the receipt of the evidence by [the] laboratory hired by Mr. House's trial attorney. Based upon the evidence introduced during the evidentiary hearing, however, the court concludes that the spillage occurred after the FBI crime laboratory received and tested the evidence.Memorandum Opinion, February 16, 2000, at 45-46.
[T]he enzyme deterioration, as well as Mr. Muncey's alleged confession and the blood spillage, does not negate the fact that Agent Scott saw what appeared to be bloodstains on Mr. House's blue jeans when the jeans were removed 683 from the laundry hamper at Ms. Turner's trailer and that the blood was in fact from Mrs. Muncey.
As indicated in the passage above, House not only presented evidence to the district court that undermined the case against him, he also offered an alternative theory of the crime: that Mr. Muncey killed his wife. . . .
The following facts that implicate House are undisputed: he lied to investigators about his whereabouts on the night of the murder; he gave inconsistent versions of 685 the origins of the scratches and bruises on his hands and arms; he was seen near where the body was discovered on the day after the murder; he lied about what he was wearing on the night of the murder; blue jeans belonging to House, spattered with blood mixed with mud, were found at the bottom of Ms. Turner's laundry hamper; House has a deep voice and Laura Muncey testified that the man who came to the trailer on the night of the murder had a deep voice; and, according to Ms. Sutton, the blood and mud found together on House's blue jeans had been mixed together, which “certainly eliminates the possibility of any stains being created by contamination in an evidence container.” We note that the fact that mud may not have been present at the crime scene, and may have been scarce in the surrounding area, cannot be taken as proof that there was no mud anywhere on the route between Ms. Turner's trailer and the scene of the crime.
With respect to House's theory that Mr. Muncey committed the murder, we defer to the finding of the district court that Ms. Letner and Ms. Parker, who allegedly heard Mr. Muncey's confession, were not credible. Furthermore, the content of Ms. Letner's testimony, indicating that Mr. Muncey killed his wife upon returning to the trailer, is belied by the presence of the children in the trailer, who heard no such confrontation, and the lack of any signs of a struggle. House's theory that a deep laceration cutting across Mrs. Muncey's head was caused when she fell and hit her head is inconsistent with the testimony of Dr. Carabia, who indicated that the laceration could only have resulted from a violent blow. The fact that Mr. Muncey may have asked his neighbor to say that she saw him at the dance during the time of the murder is insufficient to tip the balance in favor of House's theory.
Regarding House's attacks on the scientific evidence that incriminated him, he has succeeded in showing that the semen attributed to him during the trial was that of Mr. Muncey and that, at some point, the blood evidence appears to have been mishandled, resulting in spillage. However, the fact that the semen found on the victim's clothing came from her husband and not from House does not contradict the evidence that tends to demonstrate that he killed her after journeying to her home and luring her from her trailer, nor does the lack of any physical evidence of sexual contact contradict the notion that the murderer lured Mrs. Muncey from her home with a sexual motive. As for the mishandling of the blood evidence, the theory that the blood on House's jeans came from the vials of blood gathered at Mrs. Muncey's autopsy is based upon a speculative theory regarding enzyme degradation that was contradicted by other testimony in the record, and an analysis of the blood stain pattern does not demonstrate that the stains could not have resulted from Mrs. Muncey's murder. The lack of any blood spatter on House's shoes is inconclusive as well, because it is not clear when House took his shoes off. Finally, the district court's conclusion that “the spillage occurred after the FBI crime laboratory received and tested the evidence” cannot be characterized as clearly erroneous. The only unchallenged blood evidence, the testimony indicating that the blood and mud on the jeans were mixed, tends to support the conclusion that House committed the murder.
Despite his best efforts, the case against House remains strong. We therefore conclude that he has fallen short of showing, as he must, that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in light of the new evidence.
All of the issues before us having been decided, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
David G. Savage
Evidence and Doubt
ABAJ, Dec. 2005, at 20, 20-22
HOUSE'S CLAIM OF INNOCENCE COMES AFTER A DECADE IN which advances in DNA testing and aggressive defense investigations have revealed scores of mistaken convictions. The case, to be argued Jan. 11, confronts the court with a question it has never quite answered: Are federal judges empowered under the Habeas Corpus Act to overturn a state conviction based on new evidence that casts serious doubt on the defendant's guilt?
The ABA has filed an amicus brief on House's behalf, arguing that changes in science call for changes in the law so that wrongful convictions may be exposed. The advent of DNA profiling not only "revolutionized forensic science," it also helped expose "forensic 'abuse' cases involving hair sampling and pre-DNA serological evidence," the brief said.
Lawyers for House say flawed forensic science is especially troubling in a murder case built on circumstantial evidence. "This is a false science case," says New York City attorney George H. Kendall. "There were no eyewitnesses and no confession. And the motive was supposedly sexual assault." And the scientific evidence that linked House to the murder has been shown to be false or dubious, Kendall says.
Nonetheless, an en banc 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, based in Cincinnati, rejected House's habeas petition by an 8-7 vote. "It is fair to say that [House] has presented a colorable claim of actual innocence," said Judge Alan Norris for the majority.
But, Norris added, that is not enough. "To prevail, House must do more than raise questions about the reliability" of the evidence shown to the jury. Rather, he must show "that no reasonable juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence," Norris wrote. Because he lied to the police about his whereabouts, could not explain cuts and bruises, and was seen near where the body was found, it is possible to believe House committed the murder, the appeals court concluded.
Lawyers for House and the New York City-based Innocence Project urge the court to rule that federal courts should reopen state cases when "DNA objectively proves the falsity of critical 'facts' relied upon by the jury at trial."
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